INTRODUCTION
The Federal Circuit was established in part to review the decisions of the Federal District Courts and the Patent Appeals Board regarding issues of patent law. Some believe that the goal of Congress was to develop consistency in the decisions and inject the insight of patent practitioners into interpretations of patent law.
Twenty years into its existence, the success of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in achieving Congress' goals is unclear. What is clear, however, is the profound influence the Federal Circuit's decisions have had on patent law and, in turn, on the business and technology sector.
This Article reviews the court's decisions in a snapshot of time. Many of these decisions have been superceded by later cases and decisions by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, they are instructive to understand the operation of the Federal Circuit.
I. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT PRACTICE

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Federal courts require subject matter jurisdiction over a claim before adjudicating the case. 1 Congress limits the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts by requiring either a federal question, including patent jurisdiction, or diversity between the parties. 
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Alternatively, when a case involves both a federal question and a state law cause of action, federal courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction to address both claims.
3
Since 1982, the Federal Circuit has exercised exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all patent appeals. 4 In Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co., 5 the Federal Circuit agreed with the Fifth Circuit affirmation of the district court's denial of appellant's motion to remand to Texas state court. 6 The Fifth Circuit transferred the appeal to the Federal Circuit honoring its exclusive jurisdiction over appeals arising under the patent laws. 7 The Federal Circuit decided that appellant's state law contract claim implicating a patent license gives rise to a substantial question of patent law; namely, whether the accused activity infringes the underlying patent contemplated in the license. 8 The Federal Circuit in Connaught Laboratories, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham P.L.C.
9 dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction an appeal filed by the United States Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") based on its unsuccessful motion to quash third-party subpoenas requiring testimony from its employees. 10 The Federal Circuit explained that its appellate jurisdiction excludes the review of district court discovery orders. " [The] nonappealability of orders requiring the production of evidence from witnesses has long been established" and applies both to discovery orders on parties as well as nonparties. 5. 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (unpublished opinion). 6. See id. at 1464 (affirming that plaintiff's contract claim turned on the resolution of a patent law question, giving the Federal Circuit jurisdiction over the appeal).
7. See id. at 1463 (acknowledging the Fifth Circuit was correct in determining that appellant's claim included allegations that patent laws were violated).
8. See id. at 1464 (noting appellant claimed a violation of the contract because Halliburton purchased a company that violated a valid patent owned by appellant).
9. 165 F.3d 1368, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 10. See id. at 1369, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541 (describing facts in which SmithKline served subpoenas on three FDA employees to elicit their testimony and filed a motion to compel compliance with the subpoenas). The Federal Circuit held in part that because only final decisions of district courts may be considered, a nonfinal court order to compel must be dismissed. See id. (relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which limits jurisdiction "to review of final decisions of district courts") (citation omitted).
11. Id. at 1369-70, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541 (quoting Micro Motion, Inc. v. Exac Corp., 876 F.2d 1574, 1575-76, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1070, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (citation omitted)).
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12
In DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 13 the Federal Circuit expanded its appellate jurisdiction to include nonfrivolous counterclaims raising patent issues.
14 Previously, the court held that it had appellate jurisdiction over cases raising nonfrivolous compulsory counterclaims of patent infringement. 15 For purposes of its jurisdictional mandate, however, the court found no difference between compulsory and permissive patent counterclaims, giving it proper appellate jurisdiction of this copyright infringement case. 16 In In re Cambridge Biotech Corp., 17 the Federal Circuit exercised appellate jurisdiction over a district court's review of a bankruptcy court decision. 18 The court affirmed the bankruptcy court's resolution of a patent cross-license agreement because the bankruptcy constituted the core proceeding. 19 However, the raising of patent infringement claims during a bankruptcy proceeding gives rise to sufficient grounds for Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction. 20 In Puerta v. California Institute of Technology, 21 the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court's determination that 28 U.S.C.
12.
Id. at 1370, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541 (citing Micro Motion, 876 F.2d at 1577-78).
13. 170 F.3d 1354, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
14. See id. at 1359, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004 (concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) gives the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over an appeal from final judgment of a district court if the jurisdiction was based in whole or in part on 28 U.S.C. § 1338).
15. See id. (citing Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, 895 F.2d 736, 739-45, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1670, 1672-78 (Fed. Cir. 1990)) (noting that Congress intended for § 1295(a)(1) to guarantee uniformity for all non-frivolous patent law claims).
16. See id. (stating that the plain language of section 1295(a)(1) and the intent of the statute to guarantee uniformity in patent law appeals gives the Federal Circuit appellate authority over non-frivolous claims of patent infringement).
17. 186 F.3d 1356, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
18. See id. at 1369, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330 (relying on Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109, 1113 (1998), which defines § 1338(a) as expanding the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction over cases in which patent law creates the cause of action or when the resolution of a patent law question must take place in order to grant relief).
19. See id. at 1371, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331 (noting that the filing of a proof of claim is a core proceeding of bankruptcy, irrespective of the patent infringement claim).
20. See id. at 1370, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330 (determining that appellant's complaint and the district court's decision were based on 28 U.S.C. § 1338, which triggers appellate authority for the Federal Circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1)).
21. No. 99-1282, 1999 WL 592007 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 5, 1999) (unpublished opinion).
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1999 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 1385 § 1498(a) provides the Court of Federal Claims with exclusive jurisdiction over patent infringement claims against alleged infringing work performed "for the government." 22 The court recognized that such was the case even though 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) gives district courts exclusive original jurisdiction over patent infringement claims. 23 The court went on to find that to avoid such Federal Claim jurisdiction, a party must clearly show the work was not done expressly for the government. 24 
B. Personal Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction allows federal courts to exercise their power over particular parties, based on the party's relationship to the forum state. 25 Patent suits present interesting issues of personal jurisdiction as a result of the national enforcement of patents and the international manufacturers that supply products to the United States.
In Precor Inc. v. Keys Fitness Products, 26 the Federal Circuit applied the Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction analysis in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz 27 to a Taiwanese corporation. 28 The court stressed that a foreign corporation cannot evade personal jurisdiction solely because of its status as a foreign entity forced to defend itself in an inconvenient United States forum. 29 Instead, a foreign defendant must present a "compelling" case that the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction is "unreasonable" as a result of a balancing test. 30 22. Id. at *1 (ruling that work performed under contract with NASA was work performed "for the government" under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)).
23. See id. (dismissing plaintiff's contention because 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) gives the Federal Claims Court exclusive jurisdiction when it is alleged that the federal government infringed a patent).
24. See id. at *2 (finding evidence showing that contract funds were used even though work on project was terminated).
25. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (holding that, among other factors, personal conduct and connection with the forum state determine which court has personal jurisdiction over a case).
26. No. 98-1408, 1999 WL 55298 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 1999) (unpublished opinion). 27. 471 U.S. 462 (1985) . 28. See Precor, 1999 WL 55298, at *3 (holding that the particular conditions from Burger King apply to a foreign company as long as the company's activities were targeted at the residents of the forum state and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities).
29. See id. at *4 (distinguishing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) , and finding no per se rule that it is unduly burdensome for a foreign corporation to defend itself in federal court).
30. Id. at *3 (noting that the Washington District Court had been asked to decide whether a Taiwanese corporation that had allegedly sold its products through distributors in Washington to Washington customers had infringed a U.S. patent exclusively licensed by a corporation principally operating in Washington) (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477).
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The test factors include balancing the burden on the foreign company to defend in the U.S. forum (i.e., small company, lack of financial resources, or no experience in dealing with the U.S. legal system) with the forum state's interests in adjudicating the dispute.
31
Such interests include providing efficient resolution of controversies, furthering "fundamental substantive policies," and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief.
32
In Schwanger v. Munchkin, Inc., 33 the Federal Circuit reversed a district court's decision to apply Sixth Circuit law to determine the existence of personal jurisdiction. 34 The court mandated that the district court use the Federal Circuit's three-part test for personal jurisdiction in patent cases. 35 Under this test, personal jurisdiction satisfies due process when the defendant purposefully directs its activities to the forum, the claim arises out of or relates to those activities, and jurisdiction over the company is reasonable and fair. Standing requires evidence of injury, causation, and redressability. 43 The standing doctrine also requires that issues before the court are ripe 44 and not moot.
45
The Federal Circuit reviews issues of standing de novo.
46
In Amana Refrigeration, 47 the Federal Circuit held a declaratory judgment action on patent invalidity as moot where the parties had put into place a covenant not to sue. 48 The court found no actual controversy regarding the patent's validity in light of defendant's covenant not to assert patent infringement. 49 The parties entered into the covenant after the suit was filed; even so, the declaratory judgment action was not ripe to consider a possible controversy over based on current as opposed to future rights and to an actual controversy over an issue).
41. Specifically, the PTO provides the administrative remedy of filing a petition with the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks to contest a particular office action. 55 In this case, the PTO failed to assign a priority date. 56 Because the petitioner failed to pursue this administrative remedy prior to filing a complaint, the district court lacked jurisdiction over the claim. 60. See id. at 67 (holding that when a product is the subject of a commercial offer for sale and the invention is ready for patenting, the invention is "on sale" within the meaning of the statute and cannot be patented).
57
D. Clarification of Prior Decisions
61. See Scaltech, 178 F.3d at 1383, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058-59 (requiring the district court to determine whether the process offered for sale to Chevron and Champlin would meet the claim limitations regarding particle size and solid concentration in order to determine whether an embodiment of the claimed invention was offered for sale 63 vacated a district court judgment that sua sponte dismissed the parties' claims for both abuse of the judicial process and waste of the court's time. 64 The court decided that a district court cannot, without notice, punish parties so extremely in order to effectuate a timely resolution of the litigation. 65 In TransLogic Corp. v. Tele Engineering, Inc., 66 the Federal Circuit ruled that the district court misunderstood its previous decision regarding a motion on validity and therefore allowed the lower court to grant a new trial on that issue.
67
The court vacated the district court's ruling based on the earlier remand to rule on the motion for a new trial in order to address the question of validity.
68
F. Preemption
The preemption doctrine allows federal law to supplant state law in areas where the Constitution allows and Congress decides to legislate.
69
In patent law, preemption comes into play when federal and state laws encroach into the purview of patent statutes and case law. 64. See id. at *2 (stating the dismissal was an abuse of discretion since the parties were given no warning that their behavior would be sanctioned so severely).
65. See id. (stating by failing to give parties a chance to modify their behavior, the district court improperly disregarded the parties' due process rights 
73
The court ruled that Federal Circuit precedent, as opposed to that from regional circuits, would be used to resolve conflicts between patent law and other federal and state laws. 74 Specifically, the court stated:
In order to fulfill our obligation of promoting uniformity into the field of patent law, it is equally important to apply our construction of patent law to the questions whether and to what extent patent law preempts or conflicts with other causes of action. Otherwise, we will be forced into the awkward posture of holding that, with respect to cases coming to us from district courts in some circuits, patent law forecloses certain other causes of action, but with respect to cases coming to us from district courts in other circuits, it does not.
75
G. Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides for summary judgment adjudication of issues before trial.
76
The general standard for summary judgment requires the lack of genuine issues of material fact. 77 If there is no genuine issue of material fact, the district court may resolve the claim before presenting the evidence to a trier of fact. 87 to allow business methods into the realm of patentable subject matter.
88
The court held an invention employing a mathematical algorithm patentable subject matter when the algorithm is applied "to produce a useful, concrete, tangible result." 89 Even though the patent holder asserted only method claims, the court found that the lack of physical representations did not disqualify the algorithm from patentable subject matter.
90
The Federal Circuit seems eager to conform with the changing needs of computer-related inventions in our "modern world." 91 In Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 92 the Federal Circuit held that the utility requirement of patentable subject matter does not exclude a product modified to imitate another product. 93 The court found that the ability to imitate a feature satisfies the utility requirement. 94 The court compared the imitation beverage dispenser in this case to cubic zirconium, imitation gold leaf, synthetic fabrics, and imitation leather, and patents for a method of putting imitation grill marks on food, imitation wood floor laminate, and imitation hamburger. 91. See id. at 1356, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450 ("Since the process of manipulation of numbers is a fundamental part of computer technology, we have had to reexamine the rules that govern the patentability of such technology. The sea-changes in both law and technology stand as a testament to the ability of law to adapt to new and innovative concepts, while remaining true to basic principles.").
92. 185 F.3d 1364, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
93. See id. at 1368, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1703 (finding "no basis in section 101 to hold that inventions can be ruled unpatentable for lack of utility simply because they have the capacity to fool some members of the public").
94. See id. at 1367, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1703 (asserting that the successful imitation of a product can offer a "benefit sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement of utility").
95. 
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97
The patent at issue involved animation used to conform a character's lip movements to dubbed-in dialog. 98 The Federal Circuit did not find this quality sufficient to bridge Section 101, 99 and followed its earlier decision in In re Gulack,
here the printed matter is not functionally related to the substrate, the printed matter will not distinguish the invention from the prior art in terms of patentability."
101
In Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 102 the Federal Circuit considered the difference between lack of utility and enablement. 103 The court decided that the two theories of invalidity are closely related.
104
Utility requires usefulness and operability in patentable subject matter. 105 While enablement requires adequate disclosure of operability "to one skilled in the relevant art," 106 according to the Federal Circuit, inoperable patents invalidated under utility requirements also fail the enablement requirement.
107
B. Novelty
The novelty requirement of the patent statute breaks down into two categories: (1) loss of right based on the patent applicant's prefiling behavior, 108 and (2) 104. See id. ("Lack of enablement and absence of utility are closely related grounds of unpatentability.").
105. See id. at 1359, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035 (concluding that if the description of the subject matter in the application is "nonsensical," the subject matter is not useful for purposes of patentability).
106. Id. at 1358, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034. 107. See id. ("If a patent claim fails to meet the utility requirement because it is not useful or operative, then it also fails to meet the how-to-use aspect of the enablement requirement.").
108. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (describing ways in which patentability can be lost, including a patent applicant's pre-filing behavior); see also Micro Magnetic Indus. v. Advance Automatic Sales Co., 488 F. 
Statutory bar
The statutory bar requirement under Section 102(b) of the patent statute prevents an inventor from obtaining a patent if the invention was "on sale" or in public use in the United States more than one year prior to the filing date of the patent application.
110
The bar also applies to inventions that were patented or described in a printed publication anywhere more than one year before the filing date of the application.
111
In IGT v. Global Gaming Technology, Inc., 112 the Federal Circuit held that the development of a fully operational prototype one year prior to the patent's filing date and under the terms of a contract for sale triggers the on-sale bar.
113
The court followed the Supreme Court's recent decision in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 114 ruling that an invention not ready for patenting becomes so by the fact that it is offered for sale one year prior to the filing date.
115
In Datapoint Corp. v. PictureTel Corp., 116 the Federal Circuit held that an argument asserting that a prototype device did not amount to a commercial product that could be sold fails when the prototype is shown to potential customers. 117 In such a situation, patent law deems 113. See id. at *7-9 (explaining that the on-sale bar will apply where an invention is offered for sale before it is fully developed as long as it is substantially complete prior to the critical date).
114. 525 U.S. 55, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (1998).
115. See id. at 67-68, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646-47 (concluding that the "on-sale bar applies" upon the satisfaction of two conditions one year prior to the filing date: (1) the product is offered for commercial sale, and (2) the product is "ready for patenting" either through a "reduction to practice" or "descriptions of the invention sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the inventions").
116 125 which found a public use of a corset even though it was worn under clothes, to a baby playing with a blanket, observable to others, in public locations.
126
The court held that clear and convincing evidence of such a public use by the applicant more than a year before she filed the patent application triggered the statutory bar under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b).
127
In Abbott Laboratories v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 128 the Federal Circuit rejected an exception to the on-sale bar for accidental or fraudulent sales of the invention by third parties. 129 The court found that when the applicant reduces the invention to practice, the satisfying the requirement of a commercial offer for sale).
118 , at *4-5 (noting that if the court believed wearing a corset under a person's clothes was public use, it must find that playing with a blanket in public is also a public use).
127. See id. (holding that use of a blanket in public places such as parks, airports, and restaurants demonstrates that the inventor had no expectation of confidentiality, and thus it was sufficient to constitute public use as set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
128. 182 F.3d 1315, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
129. See id. at 1319, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310 (rationalizing that the purpose of the on-sale bar is to prevent inventors from taking things out of the public domain through commercialization, thus finding it irrelevant who offers the product for sale).
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Anticipation a. Inherency
The doctrine of inherent anticipation expands the scope of a prior art reference to anticipate more than what is explicitly taught in that prior art reference.
132
Inherent anticipation thereby behaves like obviousness when only one prior art reference provides all the elements to anticipate a claim combined with the knowledge of one skilled in the art. 133 The Federal Circuit in In re Robertson 134 held that mere "probabilities or possibilities" cannot satisfy the requirements of inherent anticipation. 135 The court concluded that inherency requires more than a showing that a skilled artisan would know to combine the elements in the prior art reference. it is not sufficient in establishing inherency that something may result from a particular "set of circumstances"; rather, there must be evidence that the missing element is necessary to the prior art) (citations omitted).
136. See id. (asserting that in order to establish inherency, it is insufficient to show that the combination of two elements of a prior art would be similar to an element of the invention to be patented).
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Milgraum, 137 the Federal Circuit required that the prior art reference inherently teach the limitations and their relationship to each other. 138 Certain commonly known details, such as the hairiness of guinea pigs, can be attributed to one skilled in the art once the prior art reference makes explicit the relationship between the limitations. 139 Finally, in Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO Inc., 140 the Federal Circuit held that a prior art reference that teaches the relationship between the limitations even though it has not recognized the key aspect of the applicant's invention, may inherently anticipate the patent-in-suit and thereby invalidate it. 
b. Invention by another
The patent statute under Section 102(g) 142 prohibits issuing a patent when another inventor can show that the invention was made in this country and was not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed.
143
In determining priority of the inventions as between inventors, the courts look to dates of conception and reduction to practice. 144 Courts require corroborating evidence of each of these events. 141. See id. at 1348-49, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947 (reasoning that the mere fact that the inventor of a prior art did not fully understand the inherent properties of his invention does not mean that the party who discovers such pre-existing quality should be granted patent rights because he has not discovered something novel).
142. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994) (outlining the novelty condition of patentability and the loss of right to patent an invention).
143. See id. (stating that a person will not be entitled to a patent if the invention existed previously and was not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed). See generally Young v. Dworkin, 489 F.2d 1277, 1280, 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 388, 391 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (commenting that suppression and concealment mean withholding the idea from the public and thereby preventing the public from benefiting from the idea).
144. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994) (establishing factors to consider in determining the priority of inventions: dates of conception, reduction to practice, and reasonable diligence of one "first to conceive and last to reduce to practice from a time prior to conception by the other"). See generally Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1896, 1901 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (defining "conception" as the time when the inventor has a definitive and permanent idea of a complete and functioning invention which could be applied thereafter in practice, and "reduction to practice" as constructive (when the patent application is filed) or actual (when the invention works for its intended purpose) 147 The court held that corroboration of an inventor's testimony was unnecessary unless the inventor or her assignee is a named party asserting priority, 148 or the inventor stands to gain directly and substantially from a finding of priority.
149
The court left other situations where the level of selfinterest does not rise to this high a standard to the Federal Rules of Evidence, which empower the defendant with tools to impeach the inventor. 147. See id. at 1176, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532-33 (commenting that the corroboration rule is necessary only to protect the patentee from the self-interest of a testifying inventor who may manipulate facts to produce a favorable outcome for the inventor in a case determining the priority of inventions).
148. See id. (holding that the corroboration rule does not apply to testimony by non-party inventors because often the interests of a non-party are not significant enough).
149. See id. (asserting that corroborating evidence of a testifying inventor is required when the inventor will profit from a decision rewarding priority to the invention).
150. See id. (stating that the numerous methods in the Federal Rules of Evidence and Rules of Civil Procedure by which a party may challenge or rebut oral testimony as well as the clear and convincing standard of proof required to establish priority usually protect a patentee from an erroneous finding of invalidity).
151. Cir. 1996) (asserting that the patent application must provide hard evidence of commercial success to the PTO and that evidence of commercial success is relevant "only if there is proof that the sales were a direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention-as opposed to other economic and commercial factors unrelated to the quality of the potential subject matter;" thus, "a nexus is required between the sales and the merits of the claimed invention"). 158. See Panduit, 810 F.2d at 1569, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1598 (noting that copying is an event that can be proved to have occurred, which is the reason the court calls secondary indicia "objective" evidence); see, e.g., B.F. Goodrich, 72 F.3d at 1583, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318 (indicating that extensive development by competitors and the ease or difficulty with which a non-infringing substitute can be designed can provide evidence of copying by others); Huang, 100 F.3d at 139, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689 (stating that evidence of copying is relevant to a nonobvious inquiry 162 agreed that in the same field there could be motivation to combine up to seven references. 163 The court stated that the lower courts must, however, avoid using hindsight in making its obviousness determination. 164 Similarly, the lower courts must weigh secondary indicia of nonobviousness, such as long-felt need and a governmentimposed secrecy order. 165 In In re Dembiczak, 166 the Federal Circuit found that the Board of Patent Appeals had entered the forbidden territory of analyzing obviousness based on hindsight. 167 The court held that the Board did not show suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine the six prior evidence").
159 163. See id. at *4 (upholding the Court of Federal Claims' finding that there can be motivation to combine prior art references).
164. See id. at *6-7 (commenting that a court must be aware of the dangers of hindsight because analyzing the nonobviousness of a claim using hindsight may render an invention obvious and simple to the decisionmaker, whereas at the time the invention was made, the solution may have been ingenious and complex).
165. See id. at *7 (finding that because the Court of Federal Claims considered these secondary factors of nonobviousness, that court did not err in reaching its decision). 
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1999 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 1401 art references to invalidate the patent application based on obviousness. 168 The court mandated that the finder of obviousness identify prior art, assess the knowledge of one skilled in the art, and analyze the nature of the problem solved by the inventor. 169 The determiner of obviousness cannot simply discuss ways to combine sets of prior art references so that they teach the claimed invention without actual evidence. 170 On the other hand, in In re Oggero, 171 the Federal Circuit held that in a crowded art, the references do not need to suggest explicitly the combination of references to teach the invention, provided that the prior art does not teach away from the combination of such references.
172
C. Enablement
The enablement standard requires that the patent applicant specify explicitly to the public the key aspects of the invention in return for a patent-granted monopoly. 168. See Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 1000, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617 (asserting that "[c]ombining prior art references without evidence of such a suggestion, teaching, or motivation simply takes the inventor's disclosure as a blueprint for piecing together the prior art to defeat patentability," which is "the essence of hindsight").
169. See id. at 999, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617 (declaring that these factors provide evidence of a suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine prior art references).
170. See id. (commenting that general statements about the teaching of multiple references, which are merely conclusory, are not evidence when standing alone).
171. No. 99-1116, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 18477 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 10, 1999) (unpublished opinion).
172. See id. at *4 (noting that the motivation to combine the teachings of the prior art arose from apparent gains in convenience; therefore, an invention using the combined teachings would have been obvious in view of prior patents).
173. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (requiring the applicant to explain the precise subject matter that is claimed and the manner in which it can be made and used). 176. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (requiring a description of the invention in full and exact terms); see also Standard Oil, 774 F.2d at 452-53, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 296-97 (noting that "the descriptive part of the specification aids in ascertaining the scope and meaning of the claims in as much as the words of the claims must be based upon the description").
1402
Written description
The written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) forces the patent applicant to adequately describe the subject matter of the invention in the specification.
177
The requirement is openended in that there are no restrictions as to how the specification should describe the invention; 178 instead, it must convey with reasonable clarity to one skilled in the art, that the inventor has captured the invention at the time of filing the application. 179 The written description in the specification works to limit the claims, especially in biotech cases. In In re Thorne, 180 the Federal Circuit held that method claims for a biological purification process must recite process modifications disclosed in the written description that are essential to practice the claimed invention.
181
In National Recovery Technologies, Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Systems, Inc., 182 the Federal Circuit stated "a claim is not invalid for lack of operability simply because the invention does not work perfectly under all conditions." 183 If, however, a claim is broader than the enablement taught in the specification because it requires one skilled in the art to conduct undue experimentation to practice the invention, then that inoperability invalidates the claim. 177. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (mandating the applicant to specify fully and clearly how the invention can be made and used so that anyone skilled in the relevant field can also make and use the invention).
178. See id. (requiring a written description but giving no suggestions that a particular form must be followed in presenting the description).
179. See id. (requiring applicants to explain the invention so as to allow repetition and use by someone knowledgeable in the field).
180 This analysis includes consideration of the following factors:
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented (3) the presence or absence of working examples (4) the nature of the invention (5) the state of the prior art (6) the relative skill of those in the art (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art and (8) the breadth of the claims. 
Best mode
The best mode requirement, under 35 U.S.C. § 112, requires that a patent's specification include the inventor's best mode for carrying out his or her invention.
190
This requirement applies only if the inventor has a preferred way of practicing the invention. 191. See Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1209-10, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1024 (explaining that if an inventor subjectively contemplates a best mode for the invention, that mode must be set out in the application in order to prevent the inventor from concealing it from the public. The rights gained through the grant of a patent are an exchange for public knowledge of the invention and its best mode of use.); see also Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 927-28, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1036-37 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (asserting that determination of best mode requires subjectively discerning whether the inventor contemplated a best mode, and if so, objectively determining whether the best mode was sufficiently set forth in the application); In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 816, 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 537, 544 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (" [T] here is no objective standard by which to judge the adequacy of a best mode disclosure. Instead, only evidence of concealment (accidental or intentional) is to be considered."); In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772, 135 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 311, 315 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (stating that the reason inventors are required to disclose their best mode is to prevent concealment from the public).
192. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (mandating the best mode to be explained in the application, if one is contemplated, but not requiring the applicant to state that the method described is the best mode).
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AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1381 in sufficient detail to allow one skilled in the art to practice it without undue experimentation, 193 as opposed to concealing it from the public. 194 In Ricoh Co. v. Nashua Corp., 195 the Federal Circuit held that an inventor's unrebutted testimony may prove that the embodiment of the invention disclosed in the patent serves as the best mode of the invention.
196
Such is the case when the alleged best mode used to implement the commercial product, which seems better than the patent's best embodiment, simply reduces manufacturing costs.
197
In Evans Medical Ltd., v. American Cyanamid Co., 198 the Federal Circuit held that an inventor discloses the best mode of a biotech invention if she can meet the requirements of access by the patent examiner to the microorganism during pendency of the application and public access to the material after issuance of the patent. 199 An inventor may meet these requirements by filing the preferred embodiment as a biological deposit, referring to the embodiment in the specification of the patent, and relying on the ordinary skill of the art at filing to bridge the gap of undue experimentation with knowledge of a well-established technique. 196. See id. at *14-15 (finding no evidence of clear error in the district court's conclusion that the inventors described the best mode contemplated at the time of the patent application, and upholding the district court's finding in the case).
197. See id. at *14 (upholding the district court's finding that "while the commercial embodiment was potentially relevant to what the inventors thought was the best mode, it was more relevant of the best and cheapest mode of manufacturing the cartridge, not necessarily of practicing the invention").
198 201 the Federal Circuit noted that the application of the best mode requirement depends on the completely subjective determination of whether at the time the inventor filed the patent application, he preferred a mode of practicing the claimed invention more than any other. 202 The court held that the inventor's state of mind is quite relevant to resolving the question of whether the best mode should be disclosed.
203
D. Means-Plus-Function
The patent statute allows for means-plus-function claims, which provide the inventor a drafting tool to enable any means for performing a specified function. 204 Courts often struggle with the equivalent means enabled by this type of claim and the doctrine of equivalents.
205
In WMS Gaming Inc. v. International Game Technology, 206 the Federal Circuit addressed literal infringement of a computer means-plusfunction claim. 207 The court held that when "the disclosed structure
(concluding that an applicant may withhold access by the public to the invention during the pendency of the application, provided that the patent examiner is accorded necessary access, and anyone skilled in the art can rely on the written disclosure in the application Cir. 1990 ), which explains the requirement that the inventor specify his or her preferred mode in the patent application).
203. See id. at *4-5 (stating that "the first step in determining compliance with the best mode requirement is wholly subjective and involves determining 'whether, at the time the inventor filed his patent application, he knew of a mode of practicing his claimed invention that he considered to be better that any other'" (quoting Chemcast, 913 F.2d at 927-28, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036-37)).
204. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶6 (1994) ("An element of a claim . . . may be expressed as a means or a step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claims shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.").
205. Under the doctrine of equivalents, a product or process that does not literally infringe on the express terms of a patent claim may infringe if there is substantial equivalence between the elements of the accused product or process and the patented invention. Compare Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (1997) (discussing the need for a component-bycomponent analysis of the two products or process), with Al Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1321, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining that under the means-plus-function test, a device must perform the exact purpose indicated in the claim element). See also infra notes 220-232 (explaining that both tests typically produce the same result due to their focus on insubstantial differences between the products or process).
206 is a computer, or microprocessor, programmed to carry out an algorithm, the disclosed structure is not the general purpose computer, but rather the special purpose computer programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm."
208
After finding no literal infringement, the court found infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, where the accused method had insubstantial differences such as unclaimed steps.
209
In Rodime PLC v. Seagate Technology, Inc., 210 the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of whether a claim falls within the 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 means-plus-function analytical framework. 211 The court held that, even though the word "means" in a claim element creates a presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 applies, the patent rebuts this presumption when the claim element recites a "means" without a function, or when the claim recites sufficient structure or subject matter for performing that function. 212 In Rodime, the Federal Circuit found that a detailed recitation of structure for performing the function of the means overcame the means-plus-function presumption. 213 The quantum of structure disclosed in the specification to avoid the presumption amounts to sufficient detail in the structure to perform the entire claimed function. 214 In Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Technology Corp., 215 the Federal Circuit distinguished its Chiuminatta decision on the analytical framework of means-plus-function claims. 216 In Odetics VIII, the court held that the district court had erred, and that the means-plus-function analysis does not require a component-by-component equivalence between similarity between the two constituted an infringement).
208. Id. at 1349, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391. 209. See id. at 1352-54, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394-96 (finding no literal infringement due to dissimilarities between the exact functioning of the slot machines, the district court did find that that the addition of an unclaimed step in the selection of random numbers and payoff amounts in the accused slot machine was not substantially dissimilar from the patented machine under the doctrine of equivalents).
210. 174 F.3d 1294, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (evaluating whether a computer hard drive manufacturer's patent included "thermal compensation" in the "positioning means" of electromagnetic read/write heads).
211. VII" ), wherein the Chiuminatta decision was believed to require "component-by-component" equivalence between the relevant structure identified in the patent and the portion of the accused devise asserted to be structurally equivalent).
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217
The Odetics VIII court ruled: "[t]he individual components, if any, of an overall structure that corresponds to the claimed function are not claim limitations. Rather, the claim limitation is the overall structure corresponding to the claimed function." 218 Thus, the Odetics VIII court broadened the reach of means-plus-function claims, which had been severely limited by its Chiuminatta decision.
219
In Al-Site Corp. v. VSI International, Inc., 220 the Federal Circuit utilized the doctrine of equivalents to assess the sufficiency of a finding of equivalence in a means-plus-function claim. 221 The court found several differences between 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 and the doctrine of equivalents.
222
The Federal Circuit held that "an equivalent structure or act under § 112 for literal infringement must have been available at the time of patent issuance while an equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents may arise after patent issuance and before the time of infringement." 221. See id. at 1322, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169 (finding that though the statute requires a finding of "literal infringement" under the means-plus-function test, the jury's finding of "equivalence" in the accused structure would suffice for the meansplus-function analysis).
222. See id. at 1319-22, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167-68. Among these differences, the court found: (1) 35 U.S.C. § 112 is restrictive, limiting equivalence to the "structure, material, or acts described in the specification . . . ," while the doctrine of equivalents "extends enforcement of claim terms beyond their literal reach in the event" of 'equivalence' of "elements"; (2) under § 112, a structural equivalent "must have been available at the time of the issuance of the claim" (i.e., cannot incorporate 'after-arising' technology), whereas "'after-arising equivalent' infringes . . . under the doctrine of equivalents"; and (3) under § 112, "the accused device must perform the identical function as recited in the claim element while the doctrine of equivalents may be satisfied" if such functions are "substantially" similar. Id.
223. Id. at 1320, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168. 224. See id. (explaining that one difference between § 116 and the doctrine of equivalents is "temporal" (citing Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts v. Cardinal Indus. Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that "the doctrine of equivalents is necessary because one cannot predict the future"))). In Chiuminatta, the court explained that an element may not be an infringement under § 112 because it "was not disclosed in the patent;" but it may still be an infringement because it nevertheless may be so similar to the patented element that it constitutes an 1408 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1381 emphasized that the doctrine of equivalents and equivalents under a means-plus-function analysis often derive the same result because both analyses include an assessment of the insubstantiality of the differences.
225
E. Inventorship Inventorship guarantees right of attribution to the inventor. 226 The nonjoinder and misjoinder requirements of inventorship can invalidate a patent that with deceptive intent fails to join an inventor or joins a party who did not contribute to the invention. 227 Inventorship becomes particularly problematic when inventors work for multiple entities including the government. 228 Inventorship also works in conjunction with assignment to determine who owns the rights to the patented invention. 
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In Schroeder v. Tracor, Inc., 230 the Federal Circuit sided with the employer of the inventor.
231
The court found a shop right for the employer based on an employment agreement in which the inventor agreed to assign all of his rights in inventions or improvements conceived by him regardless of whether they were within the scope of his employment.
232
The Federal Circuit upheld this assignment as a basis for a shop right defense due to the inventor's conduct in allowing his employer to use the patented inventions for a number of years without objecting or demanding royalties. 233 In University of Colorado Foundation, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 234 the Federal Circuit held that federal patent law preempts any state law that purports to define rights based on inventorship. 235 The court noted that allowing state inroads into the Patent Act's inventorship standard with independent state laws would confuse the issue with different requirements and lead to disparate remedies. 236 Such legislation would frustrate the objectives of authorship for inventors and uniform federal patent laws. 237 The court found no room under the Patent Act's detailed standards for inventorship because it contains explicit language foreclosing state supplementation of the national standard. 235. See id. at 1372, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805 (noting that since its inception in Article I of the Constitution, patent law has developed with the dual objectives of rewarding inventors and supplying uniform national standards). 35 U.S.C.'s explicit, detailed, and comprehensive regulation of patent law constitutes a pervasive regulatory scheme demonstrating Congress' intent for federal law to dominate the field. Id.
236. See id. (asserting that to allow independent inventorship standard under state law could grant property rights to an individual who would not qualify under federal law, or may grant greater relief than under federal law).
237. See id.
See id.
(concluding that Colorado's inventorship standards ran afoul of federal "field preemption" doctrine, whereby 35 U.S.C.'s explicit, detailed, and comprehensive regulation of patent law evidenced Congress's intent to institute a "scheme of federal regulation so comprehensive, that no room remains for a state to supplement"). The application of Colorado law on the matter of inventorship rights for the reformulated infant formula raised the specter of inconsistent results, confounding the dual federal objectives of patent law, and was, therefore, inappropriately applied. See id.
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239
The applicant has a duty of candor in her dealing with the examiner. Withholding or submitting false material information with the intent to deceive violates this duty and renders the patent unenforceable. 240 In Elk Corp. of Dallas v. GAF Bldg. Materials Corp., 241 the Federal Circuit reviewed the inequitable conduct requirement that prior art references not disclosed to the PTO are not merely cumulative of other references before the PTO.
242
The court also addressed the issue of whether the applicant had knowledge of how material the reference not disclosed to the PTO was to the patentability of the invention.
243
The Federal Circuit held that intent to deceive and knowledge of the materiality may be shown by circumstantial evidence such as a request for a patent search report.
244
In Origin Medsystems, Inc. v. General Surgical Innovations, Inc., 245 the Federal Circuit touched on the elements of an inequitable conduct analysis. 246 The court held that the applicant's intent to deceive must be clear, especially when the PTO knows of the prior art and its relationship to the prosecution. 247 According to the Federal Circuit, an applicant's attempt to merely distinguish prior art is not a material misrepresentation, even if the art is not distinguishable. 248 The court further noted that inequitable conduct is "rarely" appropriate in summary judgment adjudication due to the subjective finding of intent to deceive. 242. See id. at 31-32, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855-56 (finding prior art patents were material even though they were merely cumulative of specific patents that had been disclosed to the PTO).
243. See id. at 32, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856-57 (determining that the district court was correct in finding that materiality and knowledge of materiality existed).
244. See id. (holding that intent of a patent applicant to deceive the PTO rarely can, and does not need to be, proven by direct evidence. Instead, the court determines whether inequitable conduct can be established by looking at the overall facts and circumstances of the applicant's conduct).
245. No. 98-1416, 1999 WL 507160 (Fed. Cir. July 16, 1999) (unpublished opinion).
246. See id. (explaining that in an equitable conduct analysis, the PTO looks at the applicant's intent to deceive and whether the misrepresentation was material).
247. See id. at *2 (stating there must be clear and convincing evidence that the patent applicant specifically intended to commit a prohibited act).
248. See id. at *1 (noting there was a genuine issue as to whether the applicant's statement to the board was material).
249. See id. at *2 (declaring the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the applicant's intent to deceive because if the applicant's statement was a
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In Destron/IDI, Inc. v. Electronic Identification Devices, Ltd., 250 the Federal Circuit discussed the inequitable conduct standard for intent to deceive the PTO. 251 When the prosecuting attorney makes a good faith effort to disclose the results of his investigation, such as precritical date sales information, he meets his duty of good faith and candor. 252 Trying to defend the results of the investigation does not automatically lead to a finding that the applicant intentionally attempted to deceive the PTO.
253
G. Other Patentability Procedures
Interference
When a patent application and another pending application or issued patent present a potential overlap of subject matter and priority, the PTO may administer an interference proceeding to resolve priority.
254
The examiner names a senior and junior party based on who filed first.
255
The junior party bears the burden of proof.
256
In Cavanagh v. McMahon, 257 the Federal Circuit held that the junior party must prove by a preponderance actual reduction to practice prior to the senior party's filing date of the evidence. 258 The court noted that simply because a junior party makes a prima facie case of actual reduction to practice for purposes of declaring an material misrepresentation, then a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether he intended to deceive the PTO).
250. No. 98-1242, 1999 WL 37614 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 1999) (unpublished opinion).
251. See id. (affirming the district court's decision that the information provided to the PTO by Destron/IDI and Hughes Aircraft did not constitute an intent to deceive and was not, therefore, inequitable conduct).
252. See id. at *1 (asserting that the testimony of Destron's attorney was credible and did not constitute inequitable conduct).
253. See id. at *2 (noting that disorganization and poor communication does not meet the clear and convincing evidence standard of intent to deceive).
254. See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1994) (stating that "the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences shall determine questions of priority of the inventions and may determine questions of patentability."). After the review, the commission will "issue the patent to the applicant who is adjudged to be the prior inventor." Id.
255. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.611 (2000) (explaining that the PTO will send a notice of declaration of an interference to each party and outlining what the notice will contain).
256. See id. § 1.657 (establishing that in an interference proceeding, the junior party has the burden of establishing that they filed first by a preponderance of the evidence standard).
257 The quantum of the interference proceeding is greater than the prima facie standard, even if the senior party does not present rebuttal evidence. 260 
Reexamination
In a PTO reexamination proceeding, the patentee or a third party may test the validity of an issued patent based on newly discovered prior art.
261
Reexamination requires a "substantial question of patentability," meaning prior patents or printed publications material to anticipation or obviousness.
262
This procedure enables either the patentee to confirm the validity of his patent or the accused infringer to stay infringement litigation so that the PTO can reassess patentability before the court addresses infringement.
263
The patentee, however, cannot broaden the scope of his claims during reexamination.
264
In Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Converse, Inc., 265 the Federal Circuit adopted the same test to determine whether a patentee has impermissibly broadened a claim in reexamination as that used in reissue proceedings. 266 The test, similar to reissue where the patentee after two years can only narrow a claim, limits the patentee from enlarging the claim's scope beyond subject matter that would have infringed the original patent.
267
Problems usually arise when one limitation in the amended claim broadens one limitation of the claim and narrows the claim in another limitation. 268 The court ruled that 259. See id. (explaining that the junior party's argument was flawed because a declaration of interference under the prima facie standard does not exclude the Board from determining that the applicant did not satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard).
260. See id. (ruling that simply because a declaration of interference was determined and the prima facie burden was met, the junior party does not necessarily satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard).
261. In so doing, the patentee had to substantively change the scope of his claims. 273 The court held that the patent owner could enforce the substantively changed claims of the reexamined patent only after the date of the reexamination certificate. 
Continuation applications
A popular way to gain the patent advantage over a competitor's new products consists of perpetual patent prosecution based on a single original application and disclosure. 275 To do this, the patent applicant maintains a continuation or a continuation-in-part application in the PTO and amends the claim language to cover the competitors new product, provided that the initial disclosure was broad enough to lend itself to the amended claims. 271. See id. at *3 (finding that "substantive changes" were made during the reexamination proceeding and that the claims were no longer "identical").
272. See id. (noting significance in the fact that defendant amended the claim due to a prior art rejection).
273. See id. (ruling that because the patentee substantially changed his claims, summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate).
274. See id. 275. See ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS 32-33 (1999) (noting that patent prosecution is a lengthy process, and applicant may chose to file a continuation to the original application in order to hold the original filing date, which is important in determining priority of invention as compared to competitor's inventions or references).
276. See 4 CHISUM, supra note 239, § 13.03(2)-(3), at 13-12 to 13-14 (defining a continuation application as a second application that contains the same disclosure as the original application, which is entitled to the benefits of the filing date of the original application under 35 U.S.C. § 120 as long as the conditions of codependency, cross-referencing, and identity of ownership are met). Chisum also defines a continuation-in-part application as a second application which repeats some portion or all of the original application and adding matter not disclosed in the earlier application, which are entitled to the filing date of the continuation-inpart application rather than that of the patent application. The court rejected the argument that a competitor should be entitled to intervening rights for the products developed while the patentee left a continuation application pending.
279
In doing so, the court distinguished this practice from the impermissible broadening of claims two years after issuance in a reissue proceeding.
280
The court held, "Absent congressional indication that intervening rights are to be applied in the context of continuation applications, we reject [the] argument that we should judicially adopt equitable safeguards, in contravention of a established precedent, when Congress itself has declined to do so." The patent statute, under 35 U.S.C. § 271, gives the patent owner the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or offering to sell any product or process covered by the claims of the patent. 283 The scope of the patent monopoly extends to the entire country and lasts twenty years from the filing of the patent application.
284
To find patent infringement, the court must evaluate the claim construction for meaning and scope. Once the court assigns the proper meaning and scope to the claims, the court must compare the accused product or process to the claims to decide whether they literally infringe or infringe under the doctrine of equivalents. 285 written broadly without describing all species the claim encompasses). 283. See id. § 271(a) (1994) ("Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent.").
284. See id. § 154(a)(2) (1994). Until a patent issues, it cannot be infringed, even by someone who knows that an application is "pending." Once the patent does issue, the patent owner can force any infringing activity to cease, even if that activity has already begun. See DURHAM, supra note 275, at 124.
285. See DURHAM, supra note 275, at 50 (noting that guidance as to the meaning and scope of a date can be found in the plain meaning of a word, the specification 296 When the term comes up in the claim, the context of the claim will determine which concept it identifies. 297 In this case, the court found context in the claim's preamble language to support one of the two constructions in the specification. 298 In Voice Technologies Group, Inc. v. VMC Systems, Inc., 299 the Federal Circuit held that claim construction allows testimony from the inventor as a competent witness to explain the invention and what she intended to convey in the specification and cover in the claims.
300
The court clarified its decision in Markman as not automatically disqualifying inventors as witnesses. 301 Instead, the court noted, "an inventor is a competent witness to explain the invention and what was intended to be conveyed by the specification and covered by the claims."
302
In addition, the testimony of the inventor often provides background information, such as an explanation of contemporary problems in the art at the invention's conception and the inventor's solution to these problems.
303
B. Literal Infringement
Once the district court has determined the claim construction, the first level of analysis in a suit for patent infringement is whether the accused product or process literally infringes the claims of the asserted patent. The court also explained that when a claim requires a specific number of elements, the addition of elements to the accused product may avoid literal infringement. 307 The court did not find such a situation in this case, but suggests this method as a means of avoiding literal infringement.
308
C. Doctrine of Equivalents
When an accused product does not literally infringe the asserted patent, the patent owner may assert infringement under the doctrine of equivalents based on the court-created concept that insubstantial differences will not evade infringement when the accused product amounts to an equivalent of the claimed subject matter. 309 The 309. See 5A CHISUM, supra note 239, § 18.04, at 18-73 (stating that a product or a process that does not correspond to the literal terms of the claim of a patent but performs substantially the same function in substantially the same ways to obtain the same result is an infringement under this doctrine). Moreover, the doctrine of equivalents can work in reverse by excusing a product or process within the literal terms of a claim that performs the prescribed function in a substantially different way. See id. at 18-74; see also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1361, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 473, 480 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that the purpose of the doctrine is to do equity by forbidding the practice of fraud on a patent).
310. The courts face the dichotomy between the "necessity of employing the clearest possible wording in preparing the specification and claims of a patent" as set out in 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 and the "necessity of determining infringement without the risk of injustice that may result from a blindered focus on words alone." See  HARMON expanded the preclusion of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents to apply to any amendment whose purpose is unclear and not explained by the patentee. 312 The court's adoption of such a strong influence of prosecution history estoppel over the doctrine of equivalents follows the Supreme Court's decision in Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.
313
The Federal Circuit noted that in Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of whether an amendment made in response to an enablement rejection amounts to an amendment made for "reasons of patentability" that gives rise to prosecution history estoppel. 314 However, when the prosecution history of the patent does not disclose the reasons for the addition of the limitation, even if the amendment had not been necessary to overcome the prior art rejection, Warner-Jenkinson requires a presumption that the applicant added the limitation for a reason "related to patentability." In circumstances in which the Warner-Jenkinson presumption is applicable, i.e., where the reason for an amendment is unclear from an analysis of the prosecution history record, and unrebutted by the patentee, the prosecution history estoppel arising therefrom is total and completely 'bars' the application of the doctrine of equivalents as to the amended limitation.
316
The court tried to establish a bright-line rule for the operation of the doctrine of equivalents when reasonable competitors evaluate the patent's file history and try to determine the scope of any potential estoppel. 318 applied the court's analysis of prosecution history estoppel and infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 319 The court held that prosecution history estoppel arises when the applicant narrows the scope of her claims to avoid an obviousness rejection. 320 The applicant argued that she narrowed her claims to comply with the Examiner's restriction requirement; she did not amend to avoid the Examiner's obviousness rejection. 321 The Federal Circuit did not adopt the applicant's interpretation because the failure to pursue the broader claims, in such a situation, suggests that the applicant amended in order to get around the rejection. 322 The court held that the doctrine of equivalents cannot recapture subject matter given up over such an obviousness rejection.
323
The Federal Circuit in Ultrak, Inc. v. Radio Engineering Industries, Inc.
324 held that when a claim recites means-plus-function language, infringement under the doctrine of equivalents looks to the written description for the function. 325 The doctrine then allows a finding of infringement if the function and the accused equivalent function achieve the same result. 326 The court found that in that instance, the differences between the claim and the accused device are insubstantial. The court addressed the procedural question of which party bears the burden of proof on the issue of whether the hypothetical claim reads on the prior art. 333 The court held that an accused infringer has the burden of production to place the asserted range of equivalence within the scope of the prior art. 334 The patent owner bears the burden of persuasion to show that the claim does not cover the prior art.
335
The court also discouraged using the Wilson hypothetical claim analysis to redraft granted claims. The Federal Circuit held that:
While use of a hypothetical claim may permit a minor extension of a claim to cover subject matter that is substantially equivalent to that literally claimed, one cannot, in the course of litigation and outside of the PTO, cut and trim, expanding here, and narrowing there, to arrive at a claim that encompasses an accused device, but avoids the prior art. Slight broadening is permitted at that point, but not narrowing.
336
The Federal Circuit's decision in Festo v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kohyo Kabushiki Co.
337 reconsidered its all-elements analysis for the doctrine of equivalents in light of the intervening decision of WarnerJenkinson.
338
The court reviewed its precedent of "all-elements" 329 . See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871 (mandating the application of doctrine of equivalents to the elements of claim, rather than to the invention as a whole 
2000] 1999 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 1423
consideration findings of inequitable conduct, 357 frivolous claims of willful infringement, and refusal to adhere to collateral estoppel in determining whether exceptional circumstances exist. 358 The court noted that these are not determinative to the award of attorney's fees, but should be addressed under the district court's analysis. 359 
Interest on damages
A court has the ability to award interest based on its finding of damages. The Federal Circuit, in Transmatic, Inc. v. Gulton Industries, Inc., 360 concluded that in determining the correct dividing line for calculating pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, regional circuit law applies. 361 The court held that this issue extends outside of patent law and is dominated by Supreme Court precedent interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a).
362
B. Prosecution History Estoppel
The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel precludes a patent owner from making claims on subject matter that she gave up during patent prosecution to avoid patentability rejections. In Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 363 the Federal Circuit refused to apply prosecution history estoppel to an unamended claim. 364 The court held that amending the parent claims of a final claim that was returned to its unamended form in a continuation-inpart application does not trigger prosecution history estoppel. 358. See id. at 1361, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469 (agreeing with respondent that the district court properly considered opposition's assertion of willful infringement and resistance to estoppel when making "extraordinary" determination).
359. See id., 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1468 (refusing to hold that "improvident allegation of willfulness or resistance to the imposition of collateral estoppel automatically warrants an award of attorney fees").
360 Thus, emphasis on criticality of an element creates a safe harbor for reasonable competitors to take all other embodiments as unclaimed.
CONCLUSION
Lately, Congress has been changing the playing field for patent practice with a greater frequency. In the past, the Federal Circuit provided the majority of the dynamic flux in patent law. The American Inventors Protection Act has set into motion many new concepts in U.S. patent law such as domestic publication, term adjustment, and a variety of other mechanics affecting patent prosecution.
The Federal Circuit will have to consider how these new formalities affect patent practice and take them into consideration when ruling on interpretations of patent law. It is important for the cohesion of patent law that new concepts in patent law are integrated into the existing law to establish a functional patent system, as opposed to exclusively serving the goals of the political interests that lobbied to enact these concepts. The Federal Circuit will play a key role in making patent practice a manageable task within the new regime.
367. See id. at 1376, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036 (accepting respondent's argument that petitioner, through clear and convincing statements, relinquished drug formulations and is barred from claiming infringement of competitor drugs using these formulations).
368. See id. at 1379, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038-39 (describing how the collateral estoppel doctrine allows an accused infringer to take advantage of an unenforceability decision made with respect to an unrelated accused infringer).
